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The Obama administration has the opportunity to fix a crippling flaw in the homeland 
security policymaking process. When President Bush established the Homeland Security 
Council (HSC) to develop policies and integrate U.S. homeland security institutions, 
White House officials emphasized the importance of including state and local 
government representation in the council. Their inclusion is vital. Homeland security 
fundamentally differs from national security in that states and localities play the leading 
role in many homeland security missions, as opposed to federal agencies. Yet the Bush 
administration ended up excluding state and local representatives from the HSC and 
built only weak mechanisms to include their input in Department of Homeland Security 
policymaking. That exclusion helped produce a string of failures in policy development 
and institutional integration. Now, regardless of whether President Obama decides to 
merge the HSC with the National Security Council (NSC), he has the opportunity to 
make a vital change: the creation of an effective, institutionalized way for states and 
localities to help shape the policies and programs they implement. 
Merging the NSC and HSC is not without risk. I argue that if the councils are 
combined, administration officials will need to pay special attention to the span of 
control issues raised by the merger and the danger that homeland security will take a 
back seat to traditional national security priorities. I also argue that integrating 
homeland security across the federal bureaucracy – that is, horizontal integration – 
poses unique challenges that a merged council would need to address.  
These problems will be relatively easy to solve, however, compared to the challenge of 
building effective vertical integration between a merged council and state and local 
governments. The National Security Council system never created a mechanism to 
provide for state and local input into security policymaking, because those levels of 
government played virtually no role in providing for national security. The Bush 
administration recognized the need to create such mechanisms for homeland security. I 
will argue, however, that the administration left behind a homeland security system that 
is fundamentally mismatched with the leading roles that states and localities play in 
protecting the United States from all hazards. Scholars and policymakers have only 
begun to examine how to take better advantage of state and local expertise in the 
policymaking process, and include those levels of government not only in shaping the 
details of plans and programs, but the overall strategies and priorities that will guide 
homeland security for years to come. I examine a range of options to institutionalize 
such a role, regardless of whether the HSC and NSC merge, and propose criteria to help 
policymakers chose between them.  
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THE PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION 
President George W. Bush’s creation of the HSC in 2002 was part of much broader 
change in the way the United States is organized for security. Before 9/11, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) were largely responsible for U.S. security and were coordinated by the National 
Security Council. After 9/11, Bush built a parallel security system to protect the United 
States from terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is only part of 
that system. The Bush administration has also assigned terrorism prevention functions 
to the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services, Interior, and 
over a score of other federal institutions that have never before played such significant 
roles in securing the United States from attack.1 Bush established the Homeland 
Security Council to direct and coordinate this far-flung security system, led by the 
assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism.2   
Numerous recent studies argue that the next president should subsume the 
Homeland Security Council (HSC) in the National Security Council (NSC), and 
strengthen the way the White House develops U.S. policy and oversees its execution.3  
Merger advocates focus on two problems with the Bush-era council system. The first 
problem lies in the weakness and understaffing of the HSC compared to the NSC. When 
President Bush created the HSC, White House officials said it would have a staff 
comparable in size to the NSC, with the authority and political backing from the 
president to coordinate the agencies under its purview.4 The HSC actually ended up with 
a staff one-fifth the size of the NSC’s and had to labor under much more stringent 
budget and salary constraints.5 Whether or not the councils are merged, the staff 
responsible for homeland security issues needs to be adequately sized and resourced.   
The second problem lies in the integration of the domestic and international 
components of security policy. Merger advocates contend that by creating two councils 
and their supporting staffs, the White House has bifurcated its approach to national 
security issues, even though the issues themselves frequently hinge on interrelated 
domestic and international factors.6 Effective policy integration across domestic and 
international lines is indeed essential, and merging the staffs would be a good way to 
facilitate such integration. But if President Obama were to keep the HSC independent, 
closer policy integration would still be possible. The NSC and National Economic 
Council (NEC) forged an effective collaborative relationship across their respective 
jurisdictional lines during the Clinton administration. Nothing precludes the NSC and 
HSC from building an equally effective relationship, as long as President Obama and his 
homeland and national security advisers make doing so a priority. 
However, merger advocates have focused far less attention on the integration 
problems the HSC was created to solve – problems that pose especially urgent 
challenges today. Those challenges lie in the integration of homeland security efforts 
across the federal bureaucracy and between federal, state, and local governments.   
Horizontal Integration 
When President Bush created the HSC on October 29, 2001, he tasked it to “ensure 
coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments 
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and agencies,” as well as promote the effective development and implementation of 
homeland security policies.7 The council retained that coordination responsibility even 
after Congress and the president established the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). Indeed, in creating DHS, Congress codified the existence of the HSC into law 
and specified its responsibility for “effectively coordinating the policies and interests of 
the United States government relating to homeland security” and other functions as 
directed by the president.8  
Congress and the president had good reason to assign that coordination 
responsibility to the HSC. The federal homeland security system consists of an 
astounding number of institutions. Over thirty departments and independent agencies 
perform homeland security functions, creating an almost limitless array of interagency 
seams and coordination requirements.9 Making the HSC responsible for meeting these 
coordination challenges, rather than putting dozens of new agencies under the purview 
of the National Security Council, limited the risk that the national security advisor 
would be overwhelmed by span-of-control problems. Merging the two councils would 
bring span-of-control issues to the fore once again.   
The novelty of the security functions performed by these thirty institutions creates 
further problems for interagency planning and coordination. Until 9/11, departments 
such as USDA had never served significant security functions; now they play critical 
roles in protecting U.S. populations and infrastructure from attack. Melding the new 
security responsibilities of these agencies into an integrated system creates innovation 
challenges quite different from those posed by the departments overseen by NSC, which 
have been handling security issues for decades. The institutions under the Homeland 
Security Council’s purview also share a distinctive internal problem the National 
Security Council’s departments lack. DOD, the CIA and the State Department focus 
almost exclusively on security-related issues. Departments such as DHS, USDA and 
DOJ must not only help secure the United States from attack, but also perform their 
traditional domestic functions unrelated to (and sometimes in funding and 
programmatic competition with) their post-9/11 responsibilities. The NSC has never had 
to deal with such difficult intra-agency tradeoffs between security and non-security 
functions.  Yet agency tradeoffs will need special attention as the Obama administration 
builds its homeland security policies, especially as budget pressures intensify conflicts 
over agency priorities.  
This is not to argue that the HSC has been fully successful in meeting its federal 
coordination responsibilities. The Obama administration has inherited an array of 
unresolved conflicts over department roles and responsibilities for homeland security, 
including disputes between DHS and the Department of Justice over terrorism 
prevention and response;10 between DHS and the Department of Energy over preparing 
cities against nuclear or radiological attack,11 and – more recently – over which agency 
should have primary responsibility to safeguard U.S. bioterrorism research facilities 
from rogue employees.12 The administration has also inherited significant gaps in 
interagency planning for pandemics and other catastrophic incidents.   
Merging the NSC and HSC will not automatically solve any of these coordination 
problems. On the contrary: unless the administration takes special care to avoid span-
of-control problems for the national security advisor, providing sufficient attention and 
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political leverage to resolve agency turf wars and build a better integrated system will 
become more difficult. Those problems are eminently solvable. For example, if the 
merged council includes a deputy advisor for homeland security and counterterrorism, 
ensuring that the deputy has direct access to and strong support from the president for 
dealing with such issues will greatly aid in their resolution. It is far less clear, in 
contrast, how Congress and the Obama administration should fix the most serious 
failing of the HSC system: the integration of federal, state, and local homeland security 
efforts.  
Vertical Integration and the Paradox of Homeland Security 
The need for integration between different levels of government represents a crucial 
difference between homeland security and national security issues, and between the 
coordination challenges confronting the HSC and NSC. National security policies rarely 
depend on state and local implementation; DOD and other federal departments carry 
them out. In contrast, state and local governments (and police, firefighters, public 
health workers, and other professionals they employ) are absolutely vital to homeland 
security, making vertical coordination more important as a consequence.  
The two policy realms also differ in the president’s authority to solve coordination 
problems.  Scholars are fond of noting how little de facto control the president exercises 
over the federal bureaucracy.13 Nevertheless, in the national security system, where the 
primary coordination challenge lies in integrating the work of DOD, the State 
Department and the CIA, the chief executive – i.e., the president – exercises at least 
formal authority over that system and can fire department heads who resist 
coordination. The political context of homeland security is very different. Governors do 
not work for the president. They are independently elected and are the sovereign chief 
executives of their states. Homeland security thus entails a paradox. The integration 
between federal, state, and local governments is vastly more important in the homeland 
security system than in its national security counterpart. Yet the president has 
remarkably little authority to impose such vertical integration, especially in comparison 
with his command over national security institutions.     
The Bush administration sought to deal with this paradox when it created the 
Homeland Security Council. In late September 2001, then-White House Chief of Staff 
Andrew Card promised that state and local governments would be represented on the 
council.14 That representation would help the HSC bring state and local perspectives to 
bear on building an integrated homeland security system, and would give states and 
localities a say over the plans and programs they would need to implement. Including 
state and local representatives also offered a politically astute way to compensate for the 
president’s lack of command authority over them. By making states and localities party 
to the decisions the HSC hammered out, the White House could also increase the 
likelihood that they would support those policies. 
The Bush administration’s fulfillment of this pledge on state and local representation 
fared even worse than its promise of robust HSC staffing. Bush did establish a 
President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to make recommendations to 
the HSC and included state and local officials in that panel, along with private sector 
leaders, academics, and myriad other participants.15 The HSAC has issued a number of 
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insightful policy recommendations, including ones that highlight the need for stronger 
integration in the homeland security system.16 But those recommendations are purely 
advisory and the HSAC lacks any authority over HSC decisions that would affect its state 
and local members.   
In the absence of effective mechanisms for vertical integration within the HSC, the 
Department of Homeland Security took on increased responsibility to integrate state 
and local efforts with federal policymaking. The Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness gave the first secretary of DHS, Governor Tom Ridge, 
an organization thoroughly dedicated to building effective vertical collaboration.  
Ridge’s successor, Michael Chertoff, abolished that office and assigned its functions to a 
DHS Grants and Training organization with many other responsibilities.17 Yet, the 
Obama administration has inherited problems for state and local integration that go 
beyond organizational wiring diagrams. The most important problem is that DHS never 
built a sustained, institutionalized approach to giving states and localities a voice in the 
policies they would implement. The development of the National Response Framework 
(NRF) is a case in point. The NRF is the key plan for melding federal, state, and local 
agencies into a disaster response system more effective than the one that 
catastrophically failed in Hurricane Katrina. DHS officials invited state and local 
representatives to help shape the initial NRF draft, then totally cut them out of the 
revision process (during which DHS officials made drastic changes), only to reverse 
course and invite them back into the process when faced with congressional hearings on 
their exclusion.18 The Bush administration then failed to meet statutory requirements to 
provide for state and local coordination as further revisions go forward.19  
Similarly ad hoc practices have hobbled other DHS policy development efforts, with 
predictable consequences for programmatic effectiveness. Across an array of initiatives, 
the Bush administration permitted only limited and sporadic state and local input, 
producing federal policies and programs that conflict with the requirements of the non-
federal agencies crucial to the success of those policies and programs. The Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) typifies the results of this flawed process. The 
network is DHS’ key system for sharing homeland security data with states and localities 
and was supposed to be relied on by state and local officials nationwide. Yet DHS did 
not coordinate with those officials to develop effective joint policies and procedures, 
integrate HSIN with existing information sharing systems, and ensure the network 
would meet state and local requirements.20 DHS is now replicating the same 
coordination mistakes in its effort to replace the failed network with the HSIN Next 
Generation program.21  Similar coordination failures have produced gaps in U.S. plans 
for preparedness against pandemic flu;22 for integrating federal, state and local response 
efforts against nuclear attack;23 and for an array of other plans and programs.24 The 
overall assessment provided by the National Sheriffs’ Association, the National 
Emergency Management Association, and a dozen other nationwide associations 
representing state and local homeland security concerns: the federal government 
follows “top down” approaches to policymaking that are “uncoordinated and create 
unintended negative cascading effects.”25 
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SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION: NOVEL 
APPROACHES TO AN UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE 
The Obama administration can only provide for better-integrated policies, plans, and 
programs by institutionalizing a role for states and localities in shaping them. A variety 
of means exist for representatives of state and local governments to play this role either 
in the HSC or in a merged council, including the use of mechanisms authorized by the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act.26 Three problems, however, must be overcome to 
make such a system work.   
The first is cultural. Placing state and local representatives in the merged National 
Security Council would, at least initially, produce a bizarre clash of political cultures and 
professional competencies. NSC staffers are vastly more likely to know the name of the 
president of Georgia (abroad) than the governor of Georgia (at home). That is a good 
thing. The NSC staff has enormous expertise in dealing with international security 
issues, and Russia’s military incursion into Georgia is a reminder of how dangerous a 
place the world remains.   
But the state of Georgia also involves policy challenges of great importance. Georgia’s 
cities face threats of catastrophic hurricanes and other natural hazards. Mohammed 
Atta took flying lessons in Georgia before applying those skills to kill thousands of 
Americans.27 To protect against both types of threats, it will be essential for the Obama 
administration to build more effectively integrated local, state, and federal capabilities 
for homeland security. A merged council would need to be staffed with professionals 
who speak fluent “state and local,” and for whom a governor’s sovereignty is second 
nature rather than an oddity to maneuver around. 
A second and more serious problem is that of state and local capacity to provide 
representatives. Unlike the Department of Defense, state and local homeland security 
organizations lack a “float” of personnel who are not currently engaged in operations 
and can be assigned to other duties. Governors, mayors, and county executives need 
their homeland security staff available on a sustained basis; there is very little excess 
capacity to spare for other purposes. The solution – more easily said than done in 
current budgetary times – is to build that capacity so that state and local representatives 
could serve in the White House on a rotating basis. Given the importance of providing 
for state and local input into homeland security policy, that ought to become a federal 
priority, just has DHS has supported state capacity building for intelligence.  
That brings us to the third and thorniest question: how state and local personnel 
would be selected to help shape policy in the White House. A broad range of associations 
that represent state and local governments and agencies – from the National League of 
Cities, to the National Association of County Executives, to the Governors’ Homeland 
Security Advisors Council – have called for a stronger, more institutionalized role for 
those levels of government in shaping homeland security policy.28 But none of these 
associations has yet specified how that role ought to be structured, or how state and 
local representatives ought to be chosen. That question is crucial. With over 80,000 
state and local jurisdictions in the Untied States, representing all such jurisdictions in 
the White House is a non-starter. Moreover, on many issues – most notably that of 
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federal grant distribution – states, localities, and the associations that represent 
different first responder agencies frequently clash over homeland security issues.     
The November 2008 report by the Project on National Security Reform has offered 
the most fully-developed proposal to date for the selection process.  That report suggests 
that under a merged “President’s Security Council,” a homeland security collaboration 
committee would be established to provide for vertical integration. The president would 
appoint six of the fourteen members of this committee; four each would be provided by 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and four by the 
House Committee on Homeland Security.29  That proposal has the virtue (and vices) of 
“kicking the can down the road.” The question of which representatives of state and 
local governments to select would be left to legislators and the president, rather than 
specifying up front the criteria that would be used in that selection process.  
I propose a different approach, which offers a different mix of advantages and 
disadvantages. The Homeland Security Advisory Council that President Bush 
established in 2002 was limited in its impact not only by its lack of authority, but also by 
Bush’s insistence that he select the council’s members. It seems reasonable that the 
president would have final say over who serves on his White House staff. However, it 
would also be desirable to have him select from a pool of candidates selected by states 
and localities. Following that path would bring a more fully-representative perspective 
to bear on policymaking, and would be more likely to ensure state and local buy-in of 
the policies their representatives helped develop.   
To create the pool of candidates, the Obama administration might capitalize on the 
fact that states and localities have already organized into associations to build consensus 
amongst their members and represent their views. These associations are uniquely well-
positioned to judge the professional excellence of potential candidates. Of course, the 
associations can be counted on to bring conflicting preferences to bear on White House 
policymaking, just as they do in seeking to influence congressional decision making on 
grant assistance and other homeland security issues. But since 9/11, those associations 
have also engaged in far more collaborative work than ever before, starting with the 
creation of the National Homeland Security Consortium. That Consortium has united to 
call for a stronger state and local role in homeland security policymaking. Now is the 
time to embrace that recommendation and restructure the U.S. policymaking system to 
meet the unique integrative challenges of homeland security.  
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